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INTRODUCTION 
Professor Edward M. Morgan notes that “extradition, as opposed to 
domestic prosecution, has become the law enforcement vehicle of choice for 
governments willing to engage with the United States in the anti–drug 
campaign.”1  This Article will review U.S. international drug trafficking 
  
  * Dr. Aronofsky, Ph.D., J.D., has been the General Counsel and Adjunct Professor of 
International Law at The University of Montana since 1994.  He practiced international law 
in a large Washington, D.C. firm for twelve years before moving to Montana.  He has been 
teaching international extradition law in his courses for many years and his professional 
experience includes serving as special extradition counsel for two non-U.S. governments.  
The views expressed herein are solely his personal ones and should not be attributed to The 
University of Montana.  
  † Jie Qin, LL.M, LL.B, who directs the Confucius Institute at The University of 
Montana, is currently on leave from her law faculty position at Southwest University of 
Political Science and Law (SWUPL) in Chongqing, China.  
 1. Edward M. Morgan, Traffic Circles:  The Legal Logic of Drug Extraditions, 31 
U. PA. J. INT'L L. 373, 375 (2009). 
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extradition cases with the dual objectives of identifying (a) contemporary 
legal issues, trends and developments; and (b) analyzing how these trends, 
issues and developments might reasonably apply to future U.S.–China 
cooperation in international drug enforcement efforts.  Special attention will 
be paid to the recent Valencia–Trujillo court decision2 as an example of why 
extradition treaties may not be needed for effective drug trafficking 
enforcement and prosecution in certain instances.   
Part I of this Article discusses general international extradition legal rules 
and principles applied in U.S. courts, based on both treaties and comity.  
Part II describes how U.S. courts have applied these extradition rules and 
principles to select international narcotics cases during the past several 
years.  Part III looks at the Valencia–Trujillo case and why it may prove 
useful in bolstering international enforcement.  Part IV analyzes how the 
U.S. approach to extradition in drug cases, particularly extradition not based 
on treaties, might reasonably be used in future U.S.–China collaborative 
efforts to combat international drug trafficking through proactive use of the 
U.S.–China Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement (approved between the 
two countries in June 2000), even as the two countries consider the much 
more complicated issue of whether to negotiate a bilateral extradition treaty. 
I.  GENERAL U.S. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION CASE LEGAL RULES AND 
PRINCIPLES 
The United States utilizes two legal approaches to extradition.  The 
primary one involves extradition pursuant to a specific extradition treaty, 
usually bilateral, which involves either the U.S. or the other treaty party 
requesting the return of a fugitive to the requesting state.  The second 
approach, which is far less used, is extradition by comity, whereby the court 
of one country, in the interest of averting real or perceived jurisdictional 
conflicts with another country’s legal system, will defer to that country’s 
judicial order or request for a fugitive’s return to face prosecution.3 
Three legal principles apply to both extradition approaches.  First, the 
alleged crime must constitute an extraditable offense, i.e., the extraditing 
country must agree that the alleged offense is one suitable for extradition.  
This is easy enough when a treaty contains a list of such offenses, but is not 
so readily apparent with comity–based extradition.4  Second, the offense 
must constitute a crime in both countries, a requirement often referred to as 
  
 2. United States v. Valencia–Trujillo, 573 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 2010 
U.S. App. LEXIS 11027 (11th Cir. 2010).  Valencia–Trujillo subsequently filed an 
unsuccessful appeal challenging the jury foreman's bias.  Valencia–Trujillo, 380 Fed. Appx. 
936 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 682 (2010). 
 3. Stephen C. Warneck, Note, A Preemptive Strike: Using RICO and the AEDPA to 
Attack the Financial Strength of International Terrorist Organizations, 78 B.U. L. REV. 
177, 205 (1998). 
 4. Id. at 205-06. 
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“dual criminality” or “double criminality.”  Although the definitions and 
elements of the offense in each country need not be identical, some 
similarities will normally be present under both extradition approaches and 
both approaches require some form of serious punishment even though this 
need not be identical.5  The third principle, “specialty,” prohibits the 
requesting state from prosecuting the fugitive for any crime other than the 
one for which extradition is sought, although the U.S. generally allows 
requesting states to add additional criminal charges related to the 
extraditable offense if permitted under the laws of the requesting state.6  The 
U.S. also allows the receiving state to consider pre–extradition illegal 
conduct in both sentencing phases.7 
Federal statutes govern U.S. extradition procedures.8  The statutes 
establish a two–step procedure that divides responsibility for extradition 
between a federal judicial officer and the U.S. Secretary of State.  The 
judicial officer, upon complaint, issues an arrest warrant for an individual 
sought for extradition, provided that there is an extradition treaty between 
the United States and the requesting foreign country and that the crime 
charged is covered by the treaty.  If a warrant issues, the judicial officer 
then conducts a hearing to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to 
sustain the charge under the treaty.  If the judicial officer finds sufficient 
evidence, the judicial officer certifies to the Secretary of State that a warrant 
for the surrender of the person(s) subject to the extradition request 
extradition may be issued.  The judicial officer must also provide the 
Secretary of State with a copy of the testimony and evidence from the 
extradition hearing.  The Secretary of State has sole discretion to decide 
whether extradition should occur.  Extradition by non–treaty means 
generally functions through similar processes.9 
Even when the above three principles are present, a country may 
nonetheless refuse to extradite a fugitive based on a legal exception.  One 
such exception involves a political offense, based upon the extraditing 
state’s own national interpretation of what constitutes such an offense when 
a treaty does not specify otherwise.10  U.S. courts have developed a two–
part test for determining when an offense is sufficiently “political” in nature 
to fall under this exception based on whether there was some form of 
violent disturbance or uprising in the requesting country; and if so, whether 
the alleged offense is incidental to or in furtherance of the uprising.11  As 
one legal commentator notes, “[e]ven a purely political offense, however, 
  
 5. Id.; Valencia–Trujillo, 573 F.3d at 1178-79. 
 6. Warneck, supra note 3, at 207. 
 7. U.S. v. Lomeli, 596 F.3d 496 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 8. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3196 (2006). 
 9. U.S. v. Lui Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 109 (9th Cir. 1997) (providing a good 
illustration of how the process works) [hereinafter Kin-Hong]. 
 10. Warneck, supra note 3, at 207. 
 11. Ordinola v. Hackman, 478 F.3d 588, 596-97 (4th Cir. 2007). 
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when linked to a common crime such as murder, loses its political character, 
and may thus be the proper ground of an extradition request.”12  Moreover, 
political offenses normally do not include international crimes such as 
genocide, piracy, war crimes, and at least arguably, international narcotics 
trafficking.13  Another important exception to extradition under U.S. and 
international law rests on a prohibition (reflected in the U.S. FARR Act,14 
which in turn implemented the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment15).  Judicial review 
of this exception in U.S. courts is nonetheless all but nonexistent based on a 
2008 U.S. Supreme Court decision deferring to the U.S. Executive Branch 
determination of when these conditions are met, with legal challenges 
seldom successful under the sole mechanism of habeas corpus.16 
As noted above, most extraditions occur pursuant to treaty and the cases 
tend to be fairly straightforward in U.S. courts, with all but a handful of 
extradition requests made to the U.S. government resulting in the grant of 
extradition.  Extradition pursuant to comity, however, is a more complicated 
and far less common approach.  The United States makes comity–based 
extradition especially difficult by limiting its application to third country 
nationals and barring it altogether with regard to U.S. citizens and 
permanent resident aliens.17  This restriction does not restrict the U.S. from 
using non–treaty comity principles to exercise jurisdiction over alleged 
criminals once they enter the U.S. prosecutorial system, as seen below in the 
Valencia–Trujillo case. 
II.  SELECT U.S. EXTRADITION CASES INVOLVING NARCOTICS 
Both U.S. and non–U.S. courts have experienced increased activity in 
international narcotics extradition proceedings.  The U.S. has been 
especially assertive in requesting extradition of drug traffickers who seek 
refuge abroad, including traffickers who are citizens of the countries where 
extradition is sought, and at times perhaps surprisingly, these countries 
seem inclined to cooperate by sending these drug traffickers to the U.S. for 
prosecution.18 Professor Morgan notes: “The case law reveals that when the 
  
 12. Warneck, supra note 3, at 207. 
 13. Id.  Prasoprat v. Benov, 421 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2005) (ordering extradition of an 
alleged international drug trafficker to Thailand), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1171 (2006). 
 14. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 § 2242, Pub. L. No. 105-
277, 112 Stat. 2681 (clarifying 8 U.S.C. § 1231).  
 15. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20, 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987). 
 16. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008); Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664 (4th 
Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1135 (2008).   
 17. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) (2006). 
 18. See Joshua H. Warmund, Comment, Removing Drug Lords and Street Pushers: 
The Extradition of Nationals in Colombia and the Dominican Republic, 22 FORDHAM INT’L 
 
2011] U.S. International Narcotics Extradition Cases 283 
 
United States calls for drug extraditions, the fugitives tend to come; or more 
accurately, tend to be sent.”19  Below are brief descriptions of how the U.S. 
courts handle these cases when they arrive. 
A.  U.S. Appellate Court Extradition Treaty Decisions 
U.S. v. Thomas20 considered the 1972 U.S. extradition treaty with the 
United Kingdom, as applied to a large scale U.S. marijuana trafficker who, 
upon learning he would be arrested in the U.S., fled first to Jamaica and 
then to the England, from where he was extradited.  The specific treaty issue 
was whether the charges against Thomas for operating a “continuing 
criminal enterprise” conflicted with dual criminality principles because 
neither the Treaty nor U.K. law expressly included the “continuing criminal 
enterprise” offense.  Because the U.K. criminalizes marijuana trafficking, 
the Court had no difficulty rejecting Thomas’ challenge by concluding that 
what an offense is called in each country is not especially pertinent as long 
as the conduct subject to prosecution constituted a serious crime in each 
country.  This case may well be typical of how U.S. courts handle dual 
criminality challenges in drug cases, as the “continuing criminal enterprise” 
offense under U.S. law imposes very strong penalties. 
U.S. v. Cuevas21 addressed the issue of when U.S. courts can ignore 
extraditing country’s efforts to limit a sentence as an extradition condition, 
although the effort here seems legally specious.  The Dominican Republic 
took custody of defendant and extradited him to the U.S. pursuant to both 
the 1909 bilateral extradition treaty and the United Nations Convention 
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances22 on 
various narcotics trafficking charges.  Following extradition, however, the 
Dominican Republic unilaterally issued a decree declaring that the 
applicable sentence for the charged offenses should not exceed thirty years.  
The Court had little difficulty rejecting this after–the–fact effort by the 
sending country to condition sentencing and defendant’s specialty challenge 
based on the purported condition, because the U.S. had never agreed to the 
condition (nor been asked to) when extradition was sought and obtained.  
Required to interpret the U.N. Convention (to which both the U.S. and the 
Dominican Republic are parties), as well as the bilateral treaty, the Court 
found that the Convention did not require a receiving country to limit a 
sentence to the maximum allowed by the sending country’s laws if the 
  
L.J. 2373 (1999).  See Rishi Hingoraney, Note, International Extradition of Mexican 
Narcotics Traffickers: Prospects and Pitfalls for the New Millennium, 30 GA. J. INT’L & 
COMP.  L. 331 (2002). 
 19. Morgan, supra note 1, at 420.   
 20. 322 Fed. App’x 177 (3d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2813 (2009). 
 21. 496 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 680 (2007). 
 22. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, S. Treaty Doc. No. 101-4, 28 I.L.M. 493. 
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sending country never required this condition in the extradition proceeding.  
Interestingly, the trial court sentence of 390 months did not notably exceed 
the 360–month sentence proposed by the Dominican Republic and because 
of a non–extradition U.S. law sentencing issue requiring remand of the case 
to the trial court, it was likely that the defendant would receive a lighter 
U.S. sentence anyway. 
Ramanauskas v. U.S.23 addresses the issue of when and how double 
jeopardy and extradition intertwine.  The case involves the 2003 U.S.–
Lithuania extradition treaty applied to a Lithuanian citizen convicted of 
counterfeiting offenses in the U.S. pursuant to a plea agreement that 
acknowledged, but did not include, drug trafficking charges.  Ramanauskas 
was also charged in Lithuania with a drug trafficking offense for which 
Lithuania sought extradition from the U.S.  He argued unsuccessfully that 
the U.S. plea agreement barred the Lithuanian drug charges extradition 
based on the treaty provision precluding extradition for charges resolved by 
plea agreement in the requested country, because another treaty provision 
expressly permitted extradition for any charges not filed against the person.  
The U.S. Court found that the decision not to prosecute defendant for drug 
offenses meant that he could be charged in Lithuania for the alleged drug 
offenses there. 
Prasoprat v. Benov24 may well be the most controversial U.S. extradition 
case to date involving narcotics.  Prasoprat, a U.S. citizen, was criminally 
charged in both Thailand and the U.S. with heroin trafficking between the 
two countries.  Thailand sought extradition pursuant to the 1983 bilateral 
extradition treaty and the defendant opposed this on the ground that he 
would face the death penalty in Thailand for what is a non–capital offense 
in the U.S.  Although the treaty permitted either party to deny extradition on 
this basis except for murder crimes, the treaty did not require it.  The Court 
denied defendant the opportunity to contest extradition on this ground based 
on deference to the U.S. Executive Branch decision to permit extradition, 
and ordered the case dismissed.  Undaunted, however, Prasoprat then filed a 
second habeas corpus challenge to extradition based on alleged torture if he 
were returned to Thailand and although the Court recognized there may be a 
viable legal claim on this basis, the Court nonetheless concluded Prasoprat 
had provided little credible evidence this would occur and recommended 
dismissal, with his case apparently still pending on appeal.25  Although the 
2005 appellate decision has been sharply criticized, the rule of judicial non–
inquiry into Executive Branch determinations of requesting state conditions 
still prevails and seems unlikely to change.26 
  
 23. 526 F.3d 1111 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 24. Prasoprat,  421 F.3d 1009. 
 25. Prasoprat v. Benov, 622 F. Supp. 2d 980 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
 26. Andrew J. Parmenter, Comment, Death by Non-Inquiry: The Ninth Circuit 
Permits the Extradition of a U.S. Citizen Facing the Death Penalty for a Non-Violent Drug 
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B.  U.S. District Court Treaty Decisions 
In the Matter of the Extradition of Jacques Pelletier27 illustrates how 
identity of the person being sought for extradition is proved based on a 
combination of photographs, customs and immigration declarations, 
interviews with other law enforcement agencies, etc. even when there is no 
corroborating witness.  Brought under the 1908 U.S.–Portugal extradition 
treaty, the case involved a Canadian citizen sought by Portugal for alleged 
large–scale drug smuggling.  Pelletier owned a large boat seized by the 
Portuguese navy while carrying a large illegal narcotics shipment, and he 
was arrested in the U.S. when Portugal sought his extradition.  After 
determining he was the same person as that sought by Portugal, the Court 
then found extradition proper based upon evidence presented from the 
Portuguese trial of the captain and crew that Pelletier intended to ship the 
illegal drugs to Portugal for sale, a crime in both the U.S. and Portugal.    
In re Gon28 involves the application of the 1978 U.S.–Mexico extradition 
treaty to a Chinese–born Mexican citizen in some interesting U.S. judicial 
process contexts.  Gon was first arrested in the U.S. on methamphetamine 
distribution charges and while in U.S. custody awaiting trial, Mexico sought 
his extradition for major drug and related crimes (far more serious in nature 
than the U.S. charges).  Gon tried unsuccessfully to argue that (1) the 
extradition case should be deferred until after his U.S. case was disposed of; 
(2) he should be released on bail; (3) he should not be extradited for 
humanitarian and political offense reasons; and (4) he should be allowed to 
conduct evidentiary discovery of both Mexico’s and the U.S. evidentiary 
bases for the Mexican charges.  The Court rejected deferral based on the 
long–established principle that extradition proceedings should precede 
domestic prosecution because of U.S. treaty obligations, although deferral 
of the extradition removal itself could occur afterward.  The Court refused 
bail because bail is seldom if ever granted in extradition cases and also 
because Gon posed a serious flight risk.  The Court likewise rejected the 
humanitarian and political offense arguments as legally improvident.  The 
Court then refused discovery of Mexico’s evidence as a violation of 
Mexican sovereignty, but did allow limited discovery of the U.S. for the 
  
Offense [Prasoprat v. Benov, 421 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2005)], WASHBURN L.J. 657, 664-65 
(2006); Matthew Murchison, Note, Extradition's Paradox:  Duty, Discretion, and Rights on 
the World of Non-Inquiry, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 295 (2007); see Meredith Angelson, Note, 
Beyond the Myth of “Good Faith”: Torture Evidence in International Extradition Hearings, 
41 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 603 (2009). 
 27. In the Matter of the Extradition of Jacques Pelletier, No. 09-22416-MC-
SIMONTON, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44979 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 
 28. 613 F. Supp. 2d 92 (D.D.C. 2009); see also In re Extradition of Zhenly Ye Gon, 
No. 08-596, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96023 (D. D.C. 2009); In re Zhenly Ye Gon, No. 08-
596, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1563 (D. D.C. Jan. 10, 2010) [hereinafter Zhenly Ye Gon]. 
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purpose of seeing whether any U.S. evidence could negate probable cause 
for the Mexican arrest warrant.    
U.S. v. Blackiston29 involves a 1982 U.S.–Costa Rica extradition treaty 
specialty challenge to the sentencing of a U.S. citizen extradited to the U.S. 
for prosecution of various marijuana trafficking charges.  After his return to 
the U.S., the government added Ecstasy trafficking to the list of crimes 
Blackiston eventually pleaded guilty to.  The issue before the Court was 
whether Blackiston’s sentence could be enhanced for the Ecstasy charges 
not expressly included in the Costa Rican extradition order because of treaty 
language stating a person could be “punished” only for the offense(s) 
subject to the extradition decision absent exceptions inapplicable to the 
case.  Although noting various bases for sentence enhancement in 
extradition contexts based on crimes either committed in connection with 
the extraditable offenses of after extradition occurred, the Court expressed 
concern about the difference between Ecstasy and marijuana and decided to 
have the U.S. government notify the Costa Rican Government of the 
proposed sentence enhancement to ascertain whether the latter would 
object. 
U.S. v. Wathne30 saw the Court wrestle with the complicated issue of 
appropriate remedies for violation of the dual criminality rule.  Wathne was 
an Icelandic citizen residing in Russia when he was detained by Russian 
authorities pursuant to a U.S. law enforcement assistance request for 
questioning about alleged LSD money laundering activities.  Wathne 
claimed the Russians tortured him and fled to India, where he was arrested 
upon landing at the airport pursuant to an Interpol notice and subjected to a 
U.S. extradition request under the 1999 U.S.–India extradition treaty.  While 
extradition proceedings in India were pending, Wathne voluntarily agreed to 
come to the U.S. on the condition that he could raise any defenses allowed 
under the treaty (he had already succeeded in persuading at least one India 
court that the treaty did not permit extradition for the alleged offense he was 
charged with in the U.S.).  The parties conceded that extradition from 
Russia would not have occurred because of both the absence of a treaty and 
the general unwillingness of Russia to extradite or otherwise send fugitives 
to the U.S. for prosecution.  Wathne successfully persuaded the Court of a 
dual criminality violation by proving that the money laundering offense he 
was charged with was not a crime in India when allegedly committed.  The 
Court then considered various remedy options before deciding that it lacked 
both the power to dismiss the charges (the remedy sought by Wathne) and 
jurisdiction over the case.  The Court noted that if Wathne failed to leave 
the U.S. he would be considered to waive his right to be free of prosecution, 
and then pointed out that Wathne probably had nowhere to go because he 
would likely be extradited from almost any other country he fled to.  This is 
  
 29. 593 F. Supp. 2d 887 (E.D. Va. 2009). 
 30. No. CR 05-0594 VRW, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79348 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
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an interesting case because in essence Wathne won his legal battle but it is 
far from clear he could ever win the legal war. 
U.S. v. Mondragon–Garcia31 illustrates the difference between extradition 
and conditional release into the custody of a requesting state.  Two Mexican 
citizens attempting to leave Panama were stopped at the airport and detained 
for investigation of alleged money laundering.  A few weeks later, a U.S. 
federal court in Florida issued indictments against the two for what were 
probably similar money laundering offenses.  The U.S. Embassy in Panama 
then requested the conditional release into U.S. custody of the two pursuant 
to the U.S.–Panama law enforcement cooperative agreement and 
Panamanian law, deliberately choosing not to request extradition.  The 
Embassy diplomatic note described the two as dangerous members of the 
Sinaloa, Mexico drug cartel involved in large scale cocaine trafficking, 
although there was apparently no evidence presented to support this in the 
note.  They were then bought to the U.S. for prosecution.  The defendants 
unsuccessfully tried to convince the Court that their detention and 
conditional release were predicated on U.S. Government misrepresentations 
to the Panamanian authorities and a lack of evidence to support their release 
into U.S. custody.  The Court rejected these arguments by ruling that 
procedural flaws could not negate the charges.  This particular court opinion 
is not especially well–reasoned because even though extradition was 
apparently never sought, the Court nonetheless analyzed the case pursuant 
to extradition treaty law and in the end correctly concluded that procedural 
flaws in an extradition process will not normally negate a court’s power to 
criminally try the extradited persons. 
Germany v. U.S.32 illustrates how U.S. courts decide extradition disputes 
arising from trials and convictions of fugitives in absentia.  The case 
appears to involve two separate extradition treaties, namely the one between 
the U.S. and Jamaica, where Germany was in preventive custody, and the 
1996 U.S.–France treaty.  Only the U.S.–France treaty is pertinent here, as it 
was the basis for the Court’s decision finding adequate evidence to support 
the extradition request.  Germany was convicted in absentia in two separate 
French courts of various cocaine trafficking offenses.  Applying well–
established case law, the Court determined that the trials in absentia posed 
no barrier to extradition because the legal test is the same as that for 
establishing adequacy of probable cause that the crimes occurred.  In this 
case France provided more than ample evidence to meet the standard. 
In the Matter of the Extradition of Giovanni Gambino33 reflects the 
complexities of interpreting extradition treaty offense language when the 
English and non–English versions differ from one another.  The case 
involved sophisticated heroin trafficking conspiracies in both the U.S. and 
  
 31. No. 8:07-cr-119-T-26MAP, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86118 (M.D. Fla. 2007). 
 32. No. 06 CV 01201 (DLI), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65676 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 33. 421 F. Supp. 2d 283 (D. Mass. 2006). 
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Italy, with convictions obtained on some of the conspiracy charges in the 
U.S. and extradition sought by Italy under the 1983 U.S.–Italy treaty for 
certain conspiratorial acts similar in nature to those resulting in the U.S. 
convictions.  The Court considered the opinions of multiple U.S. and Italian 
legal experts to determine that the treaty provision precluding extradition 
for the same or substantially similar offenses conclusively resolved in the 
requested state did not apply; but then finding that one set of conspiracy 
charges subject to Italy’s extradition requests was not adequately presented 
or substantiated as required by the treaty, while another could be certified 
for extradition. 
U.S. v. Hunte34 addresses certain procedural aspects of extradition 
requests from foreign states arising from the U.S.–Barbados extradition 
treaty in a marijuana smuggling case.  Barbados sought Hunte’s extradition 
based on information obtained from two other persons arrested in Barbados 
in connection with the same criminal activity.  Hunte unsuccessfully argued 
inadequate probable cause for the extradition because the Court found the 
testimony by the other arrestees sufficient to support it even though there 
was a partial recantation by one of them.  The Court further found as not 
credible Hunte’s argument she was promised immunity from extradition by 
U.S. drug officials because she failed to obtain or produce written evidence 
to support it.   
C.  Some Key Non–Treaty Decisions 
U.S. v. Alvarez–Machain35 is a significant U.S. Supreme Court case 
which establishes the legal rule in the U.S. that once a fugitive or criminal 
suspect comes within the criminal jurisdiction of U.S. courts the person 
stays within such jurisdiction regardless of how the person arrives there.   
Here Alvarez–Machain, a Mexican physician suspected and charged with 
aiding in the torture and murder of U.S. DEA agents in Mexico by a 
Mexican drug cartel head, was kidnapped in Mexico by U.S. federal agents 
and brought into the U.S. for criminal prosecution.  Mexico formally 
protested the seizure, claiming it violated the U.S.–Mexico extradition 
treaty.  The Court ruled that the treaty was not the exclusive means of 
bringing Mexican fugitives into the U.S., and despite a general outcry of 
opposition from the international community objecting to the abduction as 
an egregious international law violation,36 the Court also ruled that he could 
  
 34. No. 04-M-0721(SMG), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 607 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 35. Fiocconi v. U.S. Attorney General, 504 U.S. 655 (1992); see also Sosa v. 
Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 36. See Michael J. Glennon, International Kidnapping: State-sponsored Abduction: 
A Comment on United States v. Alvarez–Machain, 86 AM.  J. INT’L. L. 746 (1992); see Halle 
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be criminally prosecuted.  Interestingly, he was acquitted of the criminal 
charges and in separate litigation, unsuccessfully sued the U.S. Government 
in a civil tort action.  The decision is very important because it supports 
proceeding with prosecution without regard to how drug offenders find 
themselves in U.S. jurisdiction regardless of whether there is an extradition 
treaty in place. 
Fiocconi v. U.S. Attorney General37 is perhaps the seminal U.S. non–
treaty extradition case involving narcotics.  The U.S. sought extradition of 
two French citizens on narcotics trafficking conspiracy charges even though 
the applicable 1868 U.S.–Italy treaty did not include narcotics offenses.  
Using comity as the basis for granting the U.S. extradition request, Italy 
turned over the two to U.S. authorities on the conspiracy charges issued in a 
Massachusetts federal court.  After their return, the two were subjected to 
additional charges involving trafficking in a New York federal court.  Citing 
specialty, the defendants argued that they should not be subjected to the 
New York charges because Italy never agreed to grant extradition on these.  
With some difficulty the Court determined that the spirit of the comity–
based extradition was complied with by concluding that the offenses were 
closely enough connected to obviate any argument that the U.S. was acting 
in bad faith towards Italy.  The Court acknowledged the viability of 
defendants’ arguments but nonetheless sided with the prosecution.  It may 
well have mattered that the U.S. had returned to the Italian courts to seek a 
broadening of the narcotics charges, and that at the time of the U.S. decision 
Italy had not objected to the U.S. charges. 
U.S. v. Gardiner38 upheld the use of non–treaty means to obtain U.S. 
custody over a Bahamian national who entered the Dominican Republic 
illegally and was subsequently charged in a U.S. court with cocaine 
trafficking conspiracy.  Although the U.S. alerted Interpol of the charges 
with the apparent intent of seeking extradition, the Interpol alert was in fact 
used to trigger a Dominican Republic law authorizing the expulsion of any 
non–citizen subject to an arrest warrant.  The Dominican Government 
turned over Gardiner to U.S. custody and he then tried to argue that the 
U.S.–Dominican Republic extradition had been violated.  The Court 
rejected this argument by concluding that Gardiner was in effect never 
extradited to the U.S. but instead was properly handed over to U.S. custody 
pursuant to Dominican law.  Although not an extradition case per se, this 
decision illustrates how international narcotics crimes can be combated 
through creative means of obtaining custody over fugitives.  
  
Doctrine: International Law, Due Process, and United States Sponsored Kidnapping of 
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U.S. v. Valencia–Trujillo39 appears to be a significant new case in the area 
of non–treaty extradition for narcotics offenses.  Convicted on various 
drug–related crimes, Valencia–Trujillo argued that both specialty and the 
U.S.–Colombia extradition treaty were violated because matters not in the 
indictments against him were used to convict him and also because he was 
charged with offenses not facially within the parameters of the treaty.  The 
Court rejected these arguments by concluding that he was extradited 
pursuant to non–treaty means because the U.S.–Colombia treaty was not in 
effect at the time of his extradition, and then concluding that he lacked 
standing to raise the specialty issue at all as this could only be done in 
treaty–based extraditions.  The potentially far–reaching implications of the 
Court ruling are elaborated below. 
III.  VALENCIA–TRUJILLO IMPLICATIONS IN FUTURE INTERNATIONAL 
NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT 
The Valencia–Trujillo case has significant implications for international 
narcotics enforcement and prosecution activities involving the United States 
because it offers some effective alternatives to the use of extradition treaties 
as a means of receiving and sending fugitives, suspects, and criminal 
defendants.  The Court ruled that persons extradited by non–treaty means 
have no legal standing to challenge alleged specialty violations, i.e., to 
claim that they are being prosecuted for offenses other than those for which 
they were surrendered.  In 2002, Valencia–Trujillo was indicted by a U.S. 
federal court for alleged drug conspiracy and criminal enterprise activities 
as a member of the Cali, Colombia drug cartel.40  Colombia arrested him at 
U.S. request with a diplomatic note also requesting that Colombia extradite 
him to the U.S. to face these specific charges.  The Colombian Justice and 
Interior Ministries approved the extradition subject to the condition that he 
could be tried “only for those charges for which he was requested, and for 
those acts which took place after December 17, 1997.”41  This 1997 date had 
legal importance in that Colombia had amended its Constitution to permit 
extradition of Colombian citizens with or without a treaty for offenses 
committed after this date. 
Before his trial Valencia–Trujillo raised the specialty argument that 
certain conspiracy counts based on acts allegedly occurring before 
December 1997 be stricken from the case.42  The trial court refused and he 
was convicted on all counts.  The appellate court rejected his specialty 
  
 39. 573 F.3d 1171. 
 40. Id. at 1173-74. 
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 42. Recent Case, Customary International Law -- Extradition -- Eleventh Circuit 
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argument by ruling that he had no right to raise this argument because he 
was extradited by non–treaty means.43  In other words, defendants may only 
challenge specialty violations if they were extradited pursuant to treaty.  
This tends to undermine the above Fiocconi case allowing specialty 
challenges in comity–based extraditions and some subsequent federal court 
decisions also allowing specialty challenges in non–treaty cases.44  The 
Court also rejected Valencia–Trujillo’s argument that specialty protected 
him under customary international law by noting that specialty probably 
does not constitute customary international law, and even if it does, no 
private right of action to enforce it exists because extradition is a diplomatic 
act between governments.45 
The Valencia–Trujillo case allows U.S. drug enforcement officials and 
prosecutors to use non–treaty extraditions more aggressively by eliminating 
surrendered fugitive specialty challenges.  The practical effect means that a 
person within U.S. criminal court jurisdiction has no legal means to 
challenge prosecutions and convictions based on charges and offenses not 
part of the non–treaty surrender process.  Although the surrendering country 
can certainly file diplomatic objections, this would not necessarily affect 
decisions that disregard specialty.  For these reasons the case has been 
sharply criticized by one commentator as “a message . . . that the United 
States cannot be trusted to live up to the promises that it makes in order to 
secure extradition.”46  Moreover, the case appears to bar persons subject to 
comity–based extradition from the U.S. to other countries to raise specialty 
challenges.  In other words, the case provides a great incentive to use means 
other than treaties as the basis for extradition.  Because a number of 
countries, including the U.S. and China, lack extradition treaties with each 
other and will necessarily require extensive diplomatic efforts over lengthy 
periods of time to get them, the Valencia–Trujillo decision provides an 
easier means to facilitate extraditions far less vulnerable to legal attack. 
IV.  U.S.–CHINA DRUG ENFORCEMENT COLLABORATION THROUGH NON–
TREATY EXTRADITION: PROSPECTS AND ISSUES 
The U.S. and China have something of an inconsistent history regarding 
drug enforcement collaboration.  It is not altogether clear that any 
significant collaboration occurred until the late 1980s, when the infamous 
Goldfish heroin smuggling case reflected both the promise of such 
  
 43. Valencia–Trujillo, 573 F.3d at 1181. 
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Treaties Lack Standing to Assert Rule of Specialty – United States v. Valencia–Trujillo, 573 
F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 2009), 33 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 377, 388 (2010).  Whether this 
criticism is valid is questionable, in that extradition was never used as the U.S. jurisdictional 
basis for trying the fugitive. 
292 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 19:2 
 
collaboration—at least initially—and a major setback which could have 
curtailed such collaboration altogether.47 
A.  The Goldfish Heroin Case: A Troubled Beginning 
The Goldfish case began in 1988, when Chinese customs brokers at the 
Shanghai Airport discovered heroin hidden inside a shipment of goldfish 
destined for San Francisco.  Chinese police officials arrested Wang Xong 
Xiao, a Chinese citizen, for arranging the shipment.  During interrogations, 
Wang allegedly confessed to assisting Hong Kong resident Leung Tak Lun 
ship the drugs to the United States.  Chinese officials arrested Leung, and 
notified the United States Drug Enforcement Agency of the pending 
shipment.  DEA agents seized the shipment when it arrived in San Francisco 
and arrested Chico and Andrew Wong.  The Chinese government extradited 
Leung to the U.S., where federal prosecutors indicted Leung and the two 
Wongs for conspiracy to import and possess heroin with intent to 
distribute.48 
In what apparently was the first time China cooperated with another 
country to prosecute a defendant charged with a criminal offense, China 
sent Wang and five Chinese investigating officials to the U.S. to assist the 
U.S. Government at the criminal trial.  The Chinese officials testified during 
the first month of the trial.  Wang was then called as a witness, and he 
testified for several days.  Wang then shocked all concerned by filing a 
petition for political asylum and testifying to the trial court that his Chinese 
captors had coerced and tortured him to confess falsely.  He claimed his 
Chinese captors ordered him to testify falsely at trial, with the threat that 
failure to comply with their demands would lead to a death sentence when 
he returned to China.49  The trial court immediately declared a mistrial but 
refused to dismiss the case against defendants, who were convicted in the 
subsequent retrial.   
Meanwhile, Wang’s asylum petition became subject to sharp legal 
conflict as U.S. Government officials sought his removal from the U.S. in 
apparent retaliation for his changed testimony.  The U.S. courts which heard 
Wang’s challenge to the attempted removal found that U.S. prosecutors had 
engaged in serious misconduct in connection with the decision to bring 
Wang to the U.S. to testify and further found that Wang should be allowed 
to remain in the U.S. as his due process rights would be violated if he were 
involuntarily returned to China to face likely torture and death.50  Both the 
trial and appellate courts excoriated U.S. Government officials for not 
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independently corroborating the legitimacy of Wang’s trial testimony 
against the defendants, and then trying to remove him from the U.S. after 
placing him in his position in the first place.51  One commentator has written 
that “[t]he Wang case demonstrated the importance of a neutral court’s 
capacity to exercise its supervisory powers to protect a witness and to 
ensure that witness testimony in U.S. proceedings is free of the taint of 
coercion.”52  Although this case might well have ended further China–U.S. 
drug enforcement cooperation, this in fact did not occur and instead the two 
countries developed new legal means to develop it. 
B.  The Lui Kin–Hong Case: Extradition Via Hong Kong 
Although not a narcotics case, U.S. v. Lui Kin–Hong53 deserves mention 
here because it addressed whether extradition from the U.S. to Hong Kong 
was permissible in the aftermath of the Goldfish decisions as Hong Kong 
was about to revert to China’s jurisdiction on July 1, 1997.  
 In 1995, when Hong Kong was still subject to British sovereignty, a 
Hong Kong criminal court charged Lui with large scale bribery involving 
tobacco imports and pursuant to the applicable U.S.–U.K. extradition treaty 
which extended to Hong Kong, U.S. officials apprehended Lui at a U.S. 
airport when he tried to enter the country on a business trip.54  After 
extradition proceedings began, a U.S. trial court released Lui on bail 
contrary to the general rule that bail is not normally allowed in extradition 
cases but a federal appeals court reversed this decision and ordered Lui held 
pending the extradition case outcome.55  
The crux of the case was whether Lui could be lawfully extradited to a 
Hong Kong criminal court system subject to China’s control.  Lui argued 
unsuccessfully that his rights could not be protected in Hong Kong; that 
there was no extradition treaty between the U.S. and China; and that even if 
there were an applicable treaty, he was entitled to a political offense 
exception for the crimes he was charged with.  The Court noted that the 
U.S. and Hong Kong (specifically the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region) had signed an extradition treaty in 1996 which contemplated 
extradition after the reversion of Hong Kong to China and further noted that 
both the U.K. and the Hong Kong treaties were in effect.  The Court also 
rejected Lui’s effort to show he could not be fairly tried by relying on the 
non–inquiry rule discussed above, because the Secretary of State has sole 
  
 51. Id. at 819-20. 
 52. David Whedbee, Comment, The Faint Shadow of the Sixth Amendment: 
Substantial Imbalance in Evidence-Gathering Capacity Abroad Under the U.S.-P.R.C. 
Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement in Criminal Matters, 12 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 561, 
563 (2003). 
 53. Kin–Hong, 110 F.3d 103. 
 54. Id. at 107. 
 55. Id. at 108; see also U.S. v. Kin–Hong, 83 F.3d 523 (1st Cir. 1996). 
294 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 19:2 
 
discretion to determine whether Lui could and should be extradited.56  
Finally, the Court found both dual criminality and specialty present in the 
case while rejecting Lui’s evidentiary sufficiency challenges and he was 
ordered extradited.57 
Although there is no mention of the Goldfish case in any of the various 
U.S. court opinions involving Lui, this is in and of itself significant because 
the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit decided both.  This Court 
could well have cited Goldfish to block Lui’s extradition based on concerns 
about Lui’s rights, but instead opted to rely on explicit treaty language plus 
the non–inquiry rule to support Lui’s extradition.  In other words, while 
knowing Hong Kong would be subject to China’s jurisdiction the U.S. 
Court did not seem concerned about it and assumed the legitimacy of Hong 
Kong jurisdictions.  Three years later a different federal appeals court 
followed the Lui Kin–Hong decision, using the same arguments, in 
affirming the extradition of another criminal fraud fugitive to Hong Kong in 
Cheung v. U.S.58  These cases have positive implications for virtually all 
narcotics cases involving Hong Kong and they help lay a foundation for 
non–treaty extraditions with China. 
C.  The 2000 U.S.–China Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance in 
Criminal Matters 
On June 19, 2000, the U.S. and China signed an important bilateral 
Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters59 in Beijing.  
This Agreement, similar to others entered into by the U.S., China, and many 
other nations, authorizes law enforcement and prosecutorial officials to 
collaborate in a number of specific areas related to criminal investigations, 
prosecutions, and related proceedings.  These areas include serving 
documents; taking witness testimony; providing documentary evidence 
assistance; expert evaluations; making witnesses available for testimony; 
locating or identifying persons; executing requests for inquiry, searches, 
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freezes and evidence seizures; helping with asset forfeitures; and perhaps 
most importantly, “transferring persons in custody for giving evidence or 
assisting in investigations; and . . . any other form of assistance which is not 
contrary to the laws in the territory of the Requested Party.”60  The 
Agreement resulted from serious U.S. concerns, shared by China, of heroin 
and methamphetamine activities affecting both countries.61  To avoid the 
coercive problems seen in the Goldfish debacle, the Agreement requires 
consent of anyone whose help is sought in the requesting country’s territory 
to consent to go there, even if the person is in the custody of the requested 
country; the Agreement also adopts extradition principles by allowing a 
party to refuse assistance if the request pertains to conduct which is not a 
crime in both countries unless the parties agree otherwise or which 
constitutes a political offense, among other exceptions.62 
These kinds of Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements (MLATs) are used, 
often effectively, to combat international narcotics and other crimes, 
although they face criticism for tending to be too much an “Americanized” 
approach to enforcement with a tendency to sacrifice the rights of 
individuals subject to the jurisdiction of countries other than the U.S.63  
Commentators seem especially concerned about the issue of rights in China, 
but at least on the face of the U.S.–China Agreement itself, there are 
safeguards built into the Agreement to avoid this problem; and organized 
crimes related to narcotics and other illicit activity involving the two 
countries are admittedly serious problems for both.64  Perhaps more 
significantly, the Agreement gives the two countries a specific framework 
for potentially effective collaboration in narcotics enforcement and 
prosecution.  Although to date, there are no reported U.S. court decisions 
utilizing the Agreement, it is quite probably only a matter of time before 
these cases emerge.  This collaboration includes transfer of persons in 
extradition–like proceedings, subject to the consent requirement. 
D.  Post–2000 MLAT Agreement Collaborative Activity 
The U.S. and China have sought to cooperate with each other in narcotics 
cases since the 2000 MLAT Agreement, which took effect March 8, 2001.  
In May 2003, the two countries joined India and Canada in taking down a 
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major heroin trafficking network centered in Fujian.  The case involved an 
elaborate sting operation conducted jointly by U.S. and Chinese officials in 
China.65  Annual U.S. State Department International Narcotics Strategy 
Reports (INSCR) cite other examples of collaboration, and in 2005 the U.S. 
DEA signed a cooperative memorandum with Chinese authorities to 
strengthen joint investigative efforts.  This in turn may have helped the 
countries break a major Colombian drug smuggling ring centered in 
Zhongshan City, southern China, and Hong Kong.66  Then a few years later, 
the two countries engaged in Operation Vulture Hunting to break a heroin 
smuggling ring that involved China, the U.S., and Canada.67  These 
collaborative efforts have been somewhat hampered by the absence of a 
formal Letter of Agreement between the two countries on how drug 
enforcement efforts should be formally and systematically coordinated so 
the countries continue their case–by–case approach. 
E.   The U.S., China and Extradition – Current Issues and 
Developments 
Because of human rights concerns, countries have been reluctant to enter 
into extradition treaties with China even though, as noted above, 
extraditions from the U.S. to Hong Kong have proceeded with U.S. judicial 
and Executive Branch blessings since 1997.  In 2005, however, Spain 
became the first country to enter into an extradition treaty with China with 
France, Portugal and Australia soon to follow.68  China now has some 
twenty bilateral extradition treaties, most with less developed countries, 
with the impetus for most of them being China’s aggressive efforts to seek 
the return of corrupt government officials who fled the country with ill–
gotten gains.69 
Extradition activities between China and the U.S. have been conducted 
on a case–by–case basis because of the absence of a treaty.  The U.S. has 
proved willing (in the non–Hong Kong context) to use comity and domestic 
immigration laws to help China gain custody of its own nationals who do 
not enjoy freedom from extradition under U.S. law.70  This approach has its 
advantages—the main one being flexibility—and disadvantages, including 
inconsistency in approaches and lack of predictability.  To the extent 
Chinese nationals find themselves extradited to the U.S. through non–treaty 
means, there appear to be few practical limits on their prosecution as 
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discussed above.  For drug enforcement purposes, extradition of Chinese to 
the U.S. for prosecution clearly requires no treaty, and this provides a viable 
mechanism for effective enforcement. 
Whether the U.S. and China will have an extradition treaty has been the 
subject of recent speculation.71  Now that western European countries and 
Australia have signed such treaties with China, the U.S. faces an interesting 
dilemma.  It can continue to conduct case–by–case extradition review on a 
non–treaty basis; or alternatively, follow these other countries with a treaty.  
It is nonetheless unclear whether a treaty is needed, because as the 
Valencia–Trujillo case suggests, Chinese who find themselves subject to an 
extradition proceeding seeking either U.S. retention of prosecutorial  
jurisdiction or U.S. return to China for prosecution have no apparent legal 
basis for seeking judicial intervention in their plights.  Therefore, non–treaty 
approaches can work.  Of course, the U.S. cannot apply such approaches to 
U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens regarding transfer to China, but 
as long as the issue remains one of international narcotics enforcement and 
prosecution, it seems unlikely that these particular criminal activities will 
not somehow find themselves, at least partly, within U.S. jurisdiction in 
some respect.   
CONCLUSION  
Extradition continues to be the primary U.S. enforcement approach to 
international narcotics offenses.  Although treaties have traditionally been 
the primary means of obtaining extradition of alleged drug traffickers both 
to and from the U.S., Valencia–Trujillo and various of the other cases 
discussed above demonstrate that treaties are neither needed, nor necessarily 
even always desired, for extradition to occur.  Comity–based extradition 
offers the advantage of eliminating judicial challenges to the basis for such 
extraditions, while necessarily limiting these extraditions from the U.S. to 
persons other than U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens.  Because the 
U.S. and China may well require a long time before agreeing to a bilateral 
extradition treaty, non–treaty extraditions offer an attractive alternative 
whenever the U.S.–Hong Kong treaty cannot be feasibly used.  Despite the 
Goldfish case fiasco, which could have permanently eliminated U.S.–China 
cooperation in drug cases, the countries have found ways to increase 
collaborative enforcement and prosecution efforts to attack their common 
objective of waging war on international narcotics trafficking involving 
their respective borders.  These authors believe that such collaboration will 
continue, and most likely expand, as the countries become more familiar 
and comfortable with how each goes about the business of eradicating the 
traffickers. 
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